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REASON, JUSTICE AND LOVE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HUMANISM OF
PETER CICCHINO
JAMIN B. RASKIN*
Reading through the articles in this symposium issue, it became
clear to not only me that Peter Cicchino’s life was a blessing to those
who came into contact with him, but that his all-too-brief journey in
legal academia will leave a major impression on the world of
jurisprudence and constitutional ideas.
Everything that he taught us begins with the premise that the
language of “rationality” and “reasonableness” in constitutional law
must be taken seriously.
“A statute or government policy whose end is not rooted in human
flourishing, and is not accessible through human experience, lacks
the minimum degree of reasonableness required by the Equal
Protection Clause and represents a radical departure from the rule of
law.”1
Thus Peter closed his astonishing article in the Georgetown Law
Journal, “Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
“Public Morality” Qualify As Legitimate Government Interests for the
Purposes of Equal Protection Review?,” a triumphant intervention in
Equal Protection and Due Process scholarship and perhaps the finest
law review debut of a law professor in the 20th century.
My Constitutional Law students know this article inside and out: it
is the only law review article I have ever assigned in its entirety.  But
this cogent masterpiece should be required reading for every
constitutional law student in the United States.
Peter presented a constitutional and philosophical argument that
                                                          
* Professor of Constitutional Law, American University, Washington College of Law.  This
Essay is based on my remarks at the Washington College of Law Memorial Service for Peter
Cicchino on August 30, 2000 and is dedicated to all of Peter’s students in the hope that they will
touch others the way he has touched them.
1. 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 193 (1998).
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decisively refuted the logic of the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick2 and
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans.3  Peter’s
powerfully concrete and irresistibly systematic analysis swept away
much of the irrationalism that still haunts American constitutional
jurisprudence.
Essentially Peter argued that what constitutes a legitimate and
rational governmental interest for minimum rationality review under
Equal Protection and Due Process must make reference to what he
carefully described as “public welfare,” that is interests that relate to
observable and measurable public goods, such as health, safety,
economic prosperity, and so on.  He contrasted these “public
welfare” interests with “public morality” interests, which are not
defined with respect to empirical harms and goods but rather are
concerned with the prohibition or encouragement of human
conduct on non-empirical grounds as simply being good or bad,
moral or immoral.
Thus, Peter maintained, there might conceivably be a legitimate
interest in regulating homosexual sodomy or otherwise
discrimination against gays and lesbians on the grounds that such
legislation is necessary to stop sexually transmitted diseases or to
promote procreation.  Such rationales can be empirically tested--and
logically  refuted, and that is precisely what Peter does brilliantly and
cogently in this article.  Straight people get sexually transmitted
diseases just like gay people do and there is, at any rate, a less
restrictive alternative to prevent such diseases than prohibiting
sodomy--there is safe sex.  Similarly, many gays do procreate and
many straights do not, which proves that there is no means-end fit in
the procreation argument.  Banning sodomy simply does not work as
a means to promote procreation.  Every public welfare argument
raised against the equality of gays and lesbians Peter takes seriously
and then demolishes with the razor-like lucidity and saintly patience
that were his hallmark.
Yet Peter was adamant, to the dismay of many of our friends, that
such “public welfare” arguments are formally correct and play a
perfectly valid role in the “contest of reasons” that he cogently
described as the essence of constitutional adjudication.
What does not fit in proper constitutional analysis, he argued, were
arguments that sodomy could be banned or gays and lesbians treated
like second-class citizens simply because homosexuality is “wrong” or
                                                          
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss1/10
RASKIN.FINAL 3/7/01  8:43 PM
2001] REASON, JUSTICE, AND LOVE 55
same-sex relationships “immoral.”  These arguments, he showed,
cannot be logically or empirically refuted--in scientific terms, they are
non-falsifiable--and were therefore in principle nothing but the
codification of bias and prejudice. In a pluralistic democracy like
ours, disembodied arguments about morality in public process are
akin to theological and sectarian dogma.  As unanswerable private
preferences, they are never suitable as minimally legitimate, much
less significant or compelling, interests for the purposes of testing the
constitutionality of laws burdening fundamental rights.  Far from
inscribing true morality into law–that is, in Peter’s terms, a morality
of actual human consequences--statutes based on empty claims about
other people’s behavior or status being “immoral” legalize injustice
and its dirty little secret, irrationality.
Peter was the ultimate rationalist.  His writing repudiates all
dogma, cant, illusion, unreason and mystification.  His death is a
tragedy because we needed his singular voice, profound sense of
humor and fierce passion in the thick of battle, but it is no tragedy in
an intellectual sense.  If we do our Peter Cicchino homework, we will
find that he has already bequeathed to us in his luminous prose the
philosophical foundations and analytic tools that we need to fight for
something we might call constitutional humanism.
Peter taught us never to accept anyone’s insistence that some
empty theoretical abstraction--like morality, the free market, the
forces of history, capitalism or postmodernity--must take precedence
over the felt needs and desires of living humanity.  Peter wanted to
test all claims and pretensions of moral, economic and ideological
systems against the observable, quantifiable needs of men, women
and children in this world.  He did not love humanity as part of an
ideological construct; he loved the people that he knew in his life,
not just Jonathan and his family and his students and colleagues and
co-workers, but his neighbors, the kids on his block, the poor and
despised, the rich and famous, and the homeless gay teenagers he
rescued on the mean streets of New York.  It is the interests of these
people, these citizens, that government must serve or it must not
pretend to act at all.
Peter’s relentless, piercing rationalism–on display in class with his
intense, loving deployment of the Socratic Method–led him to
criticize the Left’s recent fascination with the politics of
multiculturalism. It was not that he ignored or denigrated cultural
difference and the experiences of outsider groups.  Far from it.  He
celebrated human culture in all of its forms and guises, and honored
not the intrinsic self-evident virtue but the dignifying political
struggles of all outsider groups.
3
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But, fundamentally, Peter recognized, as both a rationalist
humanist and a gay Catholic Italian-American working-class hero
disabled by unspeakable illness in his final days, that, as he said in his
remarkable address on “Defending Humanity,” “we can move beyond
the things that divide us because we are united in something more
fundamental than and prior to those status attributes: a common
humanity.”  This was the remarkable spirit that animated his every
word and gesture.  I am tempted to say, following Peter and Mahatma
Gandhi (who Peter loved and often quoted), that after my
experience of two-and-a-half precious years of friendship with Peter,
I am a Catholic and a Protestant and a Muslim and a Hindu and a Jew
and an African-American and a white and a Latino and an Indian and
a straight and a gay and a bisexual and a man and a woman.  And
now also part of me has died with Peter and part of Peter lives with
me as he lives with everyone else in the huge community of people he
touched.
It was because of Peter’s belief that humanity has actual
characteristics--like hunger and thirst and a need for shelter and
clothing and love and dignity and just treatment--that he committed
his life to the political proposition that people must be treated as
people and not as things or commodities or pawns.  He lived the
ethics of Martin Buber, who insisted that proper human relationships
must be in the form of I-Thou, not I-it.
Several months before Peter died, he came to address the Marshall-
Brennan Fellows, upper-level law students at the Washington College
of Law who are teaching constitutional law to public high school
students in Washington, D.C., and Maryland.  He told us how he was
essentially driven from the Jesuits when he stood up for the right of
one of his high school students at Gonzaga who had been suspended
for a painting that he had made at school.  Peter told us of the
extraordinary impact this experience had on him.  He wrote of this
experience in the essay that is at the heart of this remarkable
symposium.  “In one fell swoop,” he wrote, “I lost my home, my job,
my community, and a large part of my identity . . . so that a 17-year
old kid could paint the pictures he wanted to paint and have his
human rights of due process and free expression respected.  But I
have never regretted it.”
Peter understood that a key part of what we need to experience
happiness is a living commitment to the progress and dignity of
others.  He was a kindred spirit to Martin Luther King, who showed
us that all life is interrelated and all humanity is involved in but a
single project.  Peter believed that going into public interest law to
fight the cruelty and depredations of those in charge is no sacrifice
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but the coolest, most rewarding, most fulfilling thing you can do.  In
his last few days, Peter kept saying he could not have lived his life with
any more pleasure, joy or love, and if you knew him, you knew he was
telling the truth.  Had he died with a billion dollars in the bank and a
Swiss chalet, he would not have been one iota happier.
Peter loved popular culture, and I am the grateful heir to his
Stephen King collection,  which no one else seemed to want.  But
Peter would have detested the moral lesson of the “Survivor”
television series, a barbaric and unworthy imitator of a British
program called “Castaway,” where they actually tried to see how well
and long a group of people could live together in a community,
growing their own fruits and vegetables and governing themselves.4
In the American series, the players were divided into teams, forced to
compete for food and luxuries, ate rats and snakes, and competed
viciously, lying, cheating and conspiring for the winner-take-all prize
of one million dollars.  It never occurred to any of the players to
rebel against the dark, authoritarian rules of the game, to declare the
competition over and split the money or, better yet, give it to the
Peter M. Cicchino Foundation.5  But Peter would have organized that
revolution in a New York minute.  He never would have tolerated that
bleak vision of human nature.  He would have taught our corporate
sponsors that no one survives unless we all survive.
I always teased Peter that he harbored one irrational faith and that
was a faith in the transforming power of love.  But the experience of
his sickness and death taught me that the transforming power of love,
as exemplified by his astonishing life, is no idle superstition or flight
of fancy.  It is a hard, verifiable, demonstrable fact in the world,
omnipresent, compelling, sometimes overflowing.  Human love is
indeed the one force that consistently derails and overcomes the
recurring violence, selfishness and superstition endemic to the social
structures that we still inhabit on this planet.  Here is to the politics
and jurisprudence of love that Peter articulated, defended,
personified.  Here is to the great Peter Cicchino.
                                                          
4. Thanks to Professor Patricia Williams for revealing the genealogy of Survivor in the
Nation Magazine and exposing its sadistic American reformulation.  See Patricia J. Williams, The
Moral Maze, THE NATION, Sept. 4, 2000.
5. The Foundation will go to fund the Urban Justice Center in New York, where Peter
worked for many years, and the Peter M. Cicchino Awards for Outstanding Service in the Public
Interest at the Washington College of Law, which will go to alumni and students who have
made significant contributions to the common good.  Donations should be sent to: The Peter
M. Cicchino Social Justice Foundation c/o Trent Norris, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen,
Three Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, California, 94111.
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